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Public Services in Hungary
The scope of public services and related legislation
In Hungary, the term is connected to several types of deliverable
services to the public. These services include social welfare services, education and
health services, environmental protection and local development, transport and public
utilities.
Local self-governments have specific functions connected to the delivery of public
services. Since Hungary introduced a three-tier governmental system, which is based
on local self-governments, county self-governments and the central government,
there are different responsibilities divided among these tiers.
The central idea behind the reorganization of the public services delivery, later
discussed in detail, was that since the local level has the most accurate knowledge
about local needs, it can therefore steer the delivery of services to themost appropriate
level.
The right to define the range and scope of service delivery is established in paragraph
8 of theLawonLocal Self-Governments passed in 1990.However, on the list of the 27
so-called “particular” duties of local self-governments, the regulation also names
those services that are compulsory local responsibilities. These responsibilities
include: the provision of kindergartens and primary education; basic health and social
services; assuring the rights of minorities; and, in communal areas, the provision of
healthy drinking water, public lighting, and the maintenance of local roads and
cemeteries.
In the case of the capital and its districts, some further obligatory performances are
defined by law. The state assures the completion of its mandatory tasks by allocating
financial tools and allowing the local self-governments to impose local taxes and
borrowmoney.
According to paragraph 43 of the Hungarian Constitution, the Law on local Self-
Governments is not the only regulation that may prescribe duties that are to be
performed on the local level. These are the sector laws and the so-called “Competency
Law” that set further obligations, such as the operation of public libraries, or, in other
areas, depending on the size and population of the settlement, the different levels of
obligatory social service, health and education service, andwaste disposal.
This means that the main framework of the definition of public services is the Law on
Local Self-Governments; however, the definition of “particular” duties of local
governments may be extended and specified by other regulations as well. The
situation gets even more complicated considering that local governments may take
local public services
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over any duties they prefer to perform for their inhabitants, provided that this does not
affect the completion of their obligatory services nor violates any legal regulations.
Therefore, besides the mandatory duties, the majority of municipalities in Hungary
also perform public sanitation, solid and liquidwaste disposal and ensure the cleaning
of the roads and parks of the settlement. In case a municipality is unable to carry out a
“voluntary” task, it may pass it on to the upper tier, namely the county self-
government which is obliged to take it over according to the regulation that says that
certain services have to be carried out only by aminimumsize of settlement or number
of inhabitants.
The transformation of the socialist state raised the question of the new division of
public and private services. Decreasing state property (utilities were transferred to the
local municipalities along with the flats, roads, and buildings in which administrative
work was done), and the lack of resources for financing the previously extended
public services, resulted in the decrease in public spending on public services.
Consequently, this spending had to be reorganized and, finally, decentralized to the
local level.
Additionally, there were several motives for decentralization, such as local
accountability, (and the higher public participation and control, that it was designed to
achieve) and the local articulation of needs and decisions on services matched (see
Hermann,Horváth, Péteri,Ungvári 1998).
As a result of the transition, the assets of the public utilities that were formerly owned
by the councils were transferred to the local self-governments. Or, for example, in the
case of water companies, the operating parts were kept and reorganized separately or
were soon privatized or otherwise refashioned by themunicipalities themselves.
The fact that assets were directly given to the municipalities created a completely
different set up of required actions and in a few years some changes needed to be
introduced to the public service regulations. According to the law, municipalities are
not obliged to perform certain tasks (e.g. secondary school education) below a given
number of population (secondary school education is only binding for the districts of
Budapest and the cities of county rights) and therefore the municipalities gave back
the task to the counties they could not finance. However, they did not hand over the
necessary assets related to the task, which actually made it impossible to carry out the
assignment. Therefore, the regulation was modified and from then on (in the case of
educational tasks, since 1993) the municipalities had to transfer to the councils not
only the duty, but also the capital, that is connected to the given task in the case that
they turn out not to be capable of fulfilling that operation. On the other hand, in the
case of some services, which were considered as particularly important for the
community (e.g. the existence of secondary schools thatwere considered an important
tool to stopping the emigration of inhabitants), local governments are reluctant to shift
this service to the county despite the financial burden it imposes upon them.
Since the responsibility of public service delivery is on the local level, municipalities
Overviewof the reforms related to public services
46
have to raise their own resources to cover the costs of services for which they do not
receive enough grants or targeted subsidies. One of the most important steps of the
reform was that local self-governments may impose local taxes and use the revenues,
e.g. from the local business tax, for their ownpurposes.
Residential consumption prices were kept on a very low level and the cross-
subsidizing of services was a common tool for equalizing the low revenues and high
costs of services.After the transition, the need to rationalize public services had to be
combinedwith the social implication of reorganization and a price increase aswell.
The transfer of assets to municipalities immediately launched a change in the
ownership and operation types of the services. In the case ofwater utilities, therewas a
great fragmentation of the previously quasi-monopolistic water service sector. The
provision of public services takes on significantly different forms in the different
sectors. While the social services (e.g. education health care and social care) are
typically provided through budgetary institutions, housing related services (e.g.
water, sewage, and heating) are usually provided by companies.
The property structure of service providers can be categorized as follows:
Budgetary institutions
In the case of municipally owned companies, service companies may take the
formof a limited company, a joint-stock company or a non-profit organization.
These companies function actually as budgetary institutions, and the
supervisory board or organ of these firms are normally composed from the
members of the assembly. In the case of public utility provision, all cities with
county rights have such companies, as do 66% of larger cities and 33% of
settlements.
Some companies havemixed ownership. Local governments choose such joint
ventures when they lack the resources for capital investment and they allow
private entrepreneurs to obtain a share of ownership to cover such investments.
This alternative normally is accomplished with a majority stake held by the
municipality and a special voting share, which is separately defined in most
cases resulting in more control by the municipality than its share would
represent. In the report of the StateAudit Office of Hungary in 2002, from 480
explored settlements 4,1% of themunicipalities had an ownership rate ofmore
than 75%, 6,2%hadmore than 50%and 7,2%hadmore than 25%ownership in
public utility companies.
Some municipalities have established concessions whereas their control on
services is kept to amaximum.
There are also private companies and NGOs that are contracted for the
provision of certain services.
According to a sample-survey conducted in the period of 1996-1998, service
providers in public sanitation, water, and sewage treatment operated in the following
Ownership types (private, public) and the main characteristics of
public service companies
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ownership-types:
The above scheme of the variety of operation alternatives demonstrates the permanent
conflict that municipalities must face: the clash of interests between the regulators,
owners and institutions that politically depend on inhabitants' support and the
municipalities' statutory responsibility to deliver services.
According to the Budget Law of Hungary, local governments receive normative
grants for a variety of tasks related to social, educational and health services. For the
tasks defined, the central budget allocates targeted grants mostly for infrastructure
developments andwaste disposal improvements.Targeted normative subsidies can be
received for liquid waste treatment purposes as well (8-10% of all central subsidies,
26,6%of the local revenues).Municipalitieswith resource deficits (in 2000more than
one third - 1227 - of themunicipalities), receive additional subsidies.
Local governments receive 40% of the collected personal income tax altogether for
the abovementioned purposes, of which 10% is allocated on the basis of origin and the
rest, 30% is used for financing grants and targeted grants (however, the actual amount
always refers to the numbers of 2 years prior). In 2000, 70% of all central funds were
used to support mandatory services, and normally it is not taken into account how
much the performance of the given task would cost when defining the sum of the
subsidy.
Additional resources are 50% of all collected duties. This amount should provide for
the operation of the related administrative agency (1-2% in the local budget). 100%of
all local vehicle taxes remain on the local level (0,5% of the local budget). Personal
income tax related to land borrowing also stays on the local level. Penalties from
environmental violations remain at 30% in themunicipality. 100%of penalties related
to infractions that belong to local competencies also make up the local budget's
Table Distribution of public service companies according to ownership type
OWNERSHIP TYPE %
Total 100%
1:
Budgetary institution 37,8%
Joint-stock company 11,42%
Limited company 30,31%
Private undertaker 11,02%
Limited or unlimited partnership 1,97%
Non-profit organization 4,33%
Other 3,15%
Source: Horváth, Kristóf, Valentiny 2001
Financing public services on the local level
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revenue source (1,5%of the local budget in 2001).
Local governments also have their own resources: local taxes (the local business tax,
communal taxes, tourism tax and property tax, amounted to 14,3%of the total revenue
in 2001), operation charges (1,8%), and the profits of operation and capital.
The charges for local utility services are defined in two stages: the official price setting
and the local statute have different areas of relevancy. Setting the charges for
communal solid and liquid waste removal is a local competency, whereas the supply's
price of drinkingwater is set centrally in the case of regional providers.
The size of expenditures related to public services varies to a great extent. The largest
amount of spending is related to actual costs (including personal wages) and to
approximately 25% of the local budget capital expenditures. When we take a look at
the distribution of expenditures by different sectors in 1999, it is education (33%) and
health care (19%) that are on the top of the list.Administration is in third place (13%),
social welfare is fourth (with app. 7%), and housing, water, transportation and
communication represent altogether only 7%.
This means that due to the organizational set-up of public utility provisions, the
spending of local governments remains very moderate. However, subsidies may be
steered toward companies that provide service.
According to a survey conducted in 1998, local self-governments only rarely monitor
Figure 1 Personal Income Tax , a shared revenue on the local level: (PIT)
Source: Balás, Hegedüs 2001, Budget Law 2003
Monitoring the public services sector
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provided services, according to indicators. Instead, theymostly rely onwritten reports
and public opinion, and 15% of them do not collect any data concerning service
delivery at all. The improvement of public service delivery due to the outsourcing and
out-contracting of services is therefore not proven, although anecdotal resources may
state it (Zupkó 2001).
Normally there are different commissions that oversee the operation of services that
are provided by a company of the municipality or the municipality itself. When
service delivery is supplied by a joint venture, representatives of the municipality
have control of the price setting andmanagement of the companies.
The State Audit Office of Hungary also prepares the monitoring of Hungarian local
self-governments. However, there rarely is reliable data on the expenditure side
according to sector.The revenue collected fromdifferent resources for voluntary tasks
are often not programmed and therefore there is no reliable data available about the
efficiency of the grants of public services and their operation.
The sector laws prescribe the minimum level of deliverable services and establish an
administrative body as supervisor.
There is another issue related to the control of service provision on the local level.As
mentioned above, local governments may provide additional financial assistance to
companies that take over duties.According to the Competition Rules of the European
Union, this means that there is an influential behavior upon the distribution of public
funds to firms. The role of regulator, owner, and maintainer often leads to cross-
subsidizing of different public services, which is not going to be possible after EU
accession.
Before the transition, the water sector was operated in a centralized, state owned
system: there were 33 regional state-owned companies under the control of the
CentralWaterAgency and the fee forwater and sewagewas determined centrally.As a
part of the decentralization process of the early nineties the ownership of water
utilities was transferred to the municipalities. Additionally, water supply became a
mandatory responsibility of the municipalities and the municipalities have the
authority to define water and sewage fees. The Ministry of Water and Environment
Protection operates a subsidy system for those water companies that have higher
expenses. Current regulation specifies that the revenue that originates from these fees
must cover the justified expenses. At present, however, no central price-setting
formula has been defined.
As a result of the decentralization, the water sector became fragmented: 377 water
companies operated in 2001 of which five regional companies are still state owned.
The sizes of the water companies vary significantly, which is represented by the fact
that 92 companies provided 96%of the total amount ofwater supply in 1998.
The new owners have the right to choose among different service provision forms
including different forms of privatization.
Only in the case of larger cities did commercialization and/or privatization occur.
Case study of thewater sector transformation inHungary
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The reasons for commercialization are political and organizational. From the side of
the municipalities there was big pressure not to raise water fees significantly.
Therefore the companies were forced to rationalize their operation in order to avoid
producing losses. However, only big companies had the experts and knowledge to
meet the new requirements and adopt such mechanism as would assure efficient
operation. As a result of restructuring and the introduction of modern management
techniques these companies could reach greater autonomy. In the case of smaller
companies, one of the biggest problems is the lack of competent experts that (aside
from the more direct political influences) prevent such companies from getting
engaged in the commercialization process.
Debrecen, the second largest city in Hungary, is a good example of successful
commercializationwithout privatization.
Water companies were privatized in six large cities and in one smaller region.
However, the privatized sector covers about 20-25% of the water supply of the
Hungarian population. The main privatizing actors were mostly foreign professional
investors who established concession contracts for 15-25 years. The water utilities as
such remain inmunicipal ownership and the foreign companies obtained a share in the
operating companies. Under the current regulation the municipality must retain the
majority ownership of water companies. Nevertheless, generally the representatives
of the foreign companies dominate themanagement boards.
There is no central policy for water privatization, the municipalities themselves have
to decide on the formbywhichwater companies are operated.
The revenue from privatization was not spent on sector improvement. However,
significant developments are needed tomeet EU requirements.
In the case of some privatized water companies, problems emerged that raised the
question of the transparency of the privatization process and the negotiating ability of
municipalities.
Regarding the structure of the sector, it seems that the smallerwater companieswill be
integrated, as there is large professional pressure towards this direction. The EU
requirements will push more and more companies towards more professional and
efficient operations that also could result in forward privatization. Future privatization
will not necessarily be completed by foreign investors as some positive examples of
domestic investors (e.g. the Szolnok case) can foster domestic investments into the
sector aswell.
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